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As the programs of special collections departments become more ambitious, the challenges 
of provisioning them become more complex. Whereas expectations of special collections 
librarians were once fairly uniform, position requirements are all over the map these days. 
Among other things, we may be expected to develop collections, process papers, arrange 
exhibitions, coordinate conferences, correspond with donor and grant agencies, publish 
scholarly articles, mark up finding aids, scan source materials, configure content management 
systems, and develop attractive digital interfaces. These increasing ambitions require us to 
think differently about how we approach not only our work but also the boundaries of our 
organizations. The question should not be what is most expedient but what is the most effective 
way to accomplish this range of tasks.
My purpose is to suggest a way to address a deceptively straightforward question: how 
should special collections librarians decide whether to hire staff, contract for services through 
the market, or engage in peer production when developing new initiatives? My goal in what 
follows is to make a primafacie case that transaction cost economics provides a useful framework 
for addressing this question. Along the way, I will illustrate this case with reference to practical 
examples of outsourcing and offshoring from my work in the office of special collections at the 
Princeton Theological Seminary Library.
The origins of transaction cost economics go back to the 1930s.2 Ronald Coase (1910 -), 
a British economist, published a seminal paper in 1937 titled The Nature o f the Firm? Coase 
asked why firms, that is, corporations and other forms of legal organization, exist in market 
economies. If markets are efficient, then it should be more profitable to purchase products and 
services through the market than to develop them within firms. But since firms do profitably 
exist, Coase reasoned that there must be an economic rationale for their existence. His proposal 
was that organizing production through the market was not frictionless, but involved certain 
costs. “The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm,” he suggested, “would seem to 
be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism.”4 In other words, the additional expense 
of discovering the price of a good or service, contracting for it, and enforcing that contract 
may make it more profitable to produce that good or service within a firm than to purchase it 
on the market. The upshot of Coases thought is that market prices can be deceiving; market 
prices do not include the full cost, which also includes the frictions related to information 
acquisition, contracting, and enforcing contracts. To see the justice of this point, just consider 
that in a world without transaction costs firms would not need lawyers —  and yet, how many 
legal firms specialize precisely in commercial law?
Ronald Coase was awarded the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1991. In his history of the 
prize,5 Thomas Karier contends that Coase received it largely on the basis of his 1937 article 
and a 1960 article titled “The Problem of Social Cost.”6 The common thread linking the 
articles is his appreciation for “transaction costs,” which, like sand grains, can be sufficient to 
produce sizeable pearls.
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How does Coase’s insight apply to libraries? The short answer is that Coase can help special 
collections librarians decide whether to develop products or services in-house or whether to 
buy goods from vendors or outsource services to service providers. Will it be expedient to 
hire employees to develop a new service, for example, or does it make sense to outsource? 
Librarians face this question all the time, but frequently fail to take into account transaction 
costs. Coase teaches us that such decisions cannot be made on tlje basis of price alone (e.g., 
the costs of hiring and managing a new employee, including salary plus benefits but also 
training costs, management costs, etc. versus contracting with a service provider) since the 
market price hides information about the actual cost, including the informational costs (e.g., 
engaging in a “Request for Proposals” process), contracting costs (including a manager’s time 
and legal resources), as well as the ongoing costs of monitoring and reviewing the product (e.g., 
quality control and dispute resolution). But this short answer does not suffice, especially since 
the topic of hiring versus outsourcing is controversial; a longer answer is required to fend off 
misunderstanding.
In what follows, I make several assumptions that restrict the application of Coase’s theory 
but are necessary to maintain the scope of this paper.
First, let me define what I understand by my terms. By “outsourcing,” I mean relations 
mediated through the market rather than the organization. In practical terms, I mean 
contracting with a vendor to perform some service or provide some product. By “offshoring,” I 
have in mind outsourcing with an international vendor —  e.g., with a vendor whose operations 
are located in China. Offshoring is essentially equivalent to outsourcing with the distinction 
o f wage arbitrage. That is, offshoring takes advantage of differences in prevailing wages for the 
same work, passing along the savings in the form of lower costs. A related term, “insourcing,” 
is sometimes also used for contractual relationships where work is carried out onsite but under 
the management of the external party rather than the contracting organization.
Second, I am not talking about “outsourcing” libraries in general. The question whether 
libraries should exist at all in societies with free markets (or perhaps “capitalist” societies) is, of 
course, quite controversial. W ith respect to public libraries, for instance, one hears frequently 
the complaint that taxpayers as a whole should not be required to pay for the information 
and entertainment needs of the few library users in their communities. Would it not be more 
efficient to allow citizens to purchase books, DVDs, and other media according to their 
individual preferences by eliminating public libraries and lowering tax rates? This question goes 
beyond the scope of this paper, especially since it fails to deal with the political (i.e., questions 
of justice and fairness) issues and also the indirect economic benefits of public libraries. One 
must keep other rationales in mind when accounting for school media centers, academic 
libraries, and special libraries. For the purpose of this paper, then, I will assume the existence 
of academic libraries and restrict my line of investigation to decisions about how to allocate 
resources within their special collections departments.
Third, I assume that Coases insights apply mutatis mutandis to non-profit organizations 
as well as to for-profit corporations. This is a significant assumption because some economists 
regard non-profits as prone to inefficiencies since they are not subject to market discipline in 
the same manner as for-profits.7 This point has been contested, however.8 For our purposes, 
we assume that non-profits share the same requirement as for-profits to allocate scarce
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resources efficiently. Anyone who has acted as a budget officer in a library can attest to the 
scarcity of resources. And non-profit administrators also bear a fiduciary responsibility to 
allocate resources efficiently.9 So we assume that special collections librarians intend to make 
economically efficient decisions about hiring or outsourcing and do not introduce non- 
economic considerations into the decision-making process.
Lastly, I should make clear that our study is concerned with components of the library rather 
than the library as whole. In other words, the question is whether to hire or to outsource (or to 
engage in peer production —  see below) certain services, not whether to privatize the library 
as a whole. Privatization has been called one of the “sacred cows” of librarianship.10 “There’s a 
consensus among librarians,” writes Gordon Flagg in American Libraries, “that such practices 
are a potential threat to professionalism and an abdication of librarians’ responsibilities.”11 The 
issue at stake in the privatization debate is whether for-profit or non-profit models provide 
more efficient libraries. In our discussion, however, the question is more fundamental — 
what products and services should constitute a library? Assuming that there are incorporated 
libraries, the discussion of for-profit versus non-profit reflects a disagreement about the proper 
legal framework for incorporation but does not touch on the subject at issue.
We may turn at this point to the work of Oliver Williamson (1932 -), who developed 
Ronald Coase’s theory that firms arise in response to transaction costs firms into a school 
of thought he titled “New Institutional Economics.”12 Williamson enriched Coase’s 
understanding of transaction costs by “dimensionalizing” his concept of transactions.13 That 
is, Williamson identified at least three dimensions of a transaction that can lead to different 
decisions about organizing through the market or developing internally: uncertainty, frequency, 
and asset specificity.14 Obviously, the greater the level of uncertainty, the more likely it is that 
firms will organize transactions internally since the cost of revising agreements due to shifting 
and unpredictable circumstances will be high.15 By contrast, recurring purchases of materials 
are best left to the market.16 The third dimension, asset specificity, was among Williamsons 
creative contributions.17 Roughly, he suggested that more “idiosyncratic” transactions, namely 
transactions in which the asset is produced to meet the specific needs of the purchaser and 
may not be resalable elsewhere, will generally lead, if not to integration, then to strategic 
agreements, such as partnerships. Williamson was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 
2009.
Williamson advances our understanding of our initial query about when to hire, purchase, 
or engage in peer production by focusing on drawing what he terms, following William Ouchi, 
“efficient boundaries.”18 W hat is the efficient boundary of the firm? Let us picture the firm and 
the market as two intersecting sets as, for example, in a Venn diagram. The symmetric difference 
of the two sets represents, on the one hand, what Williamson terms the “core” activities of the 
firm, and, on the other, obvious market transactions. The intersection of the two sets leaves 
a wide area o f overlap in which it is not immediately obvious whether the activity should be 
carried out by the firm or contracted out to the market. A manager thus needs to determine 
where to draw the line between the firm and the market in this intersection. The line the 
manager draws through the intersection represents an edge of the efficient boundary of the 
firm. “The efficient boundary,” writes Williamson, “is the inclusive set of core plus additional 
stages for which own supply can be shown to be the efficient choice.”19
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Let’s put the point more simply. Imagine sorting the transactions of a library into three 
columns: core, marginal, and market. We might, for instance, place administration, strategic 
planning, collection development, reference services, etc. into the core activities. By contrast, 
we might put supply purchases, telephony and telecommunication services, and the integrated 
library system into the market column. But this still leaves a number of transactions that could 
be handled by the library or vendors. For example, should the library hire maintenance staff 
or should it contract with a maintenance service? Should the library hire a web designer or 
contract out to a web design company? Should the library develop a préservation department 
or should it send out books for repair? How the library decides to draw the line between 
the firm and the market in the middle column will determine its boundary. Whether the 
line has been drawn efficiently will be determined not only by comparing the price of hiring 
versus buying but also the transaction costs that accompany both decisions. O f course, these 
decisions may also reflect strategic priorities. A library may decide, for example, to develop 
its own digital library platform rather than purchase a vendor’s commodity platform because 
its librarians want to deploy highly customized web applications. A library may decide to 
outsource cataloging because it has mostly generic books whereas another library may hire 
many catalogers because it wants to develop a rare book catalog for scholars. These decisions 
shape not only the “efficient boundary” of the library but also its institutional character.
In the special collections of the Princeton Seminary Library, for example, weve concluded 
that it’s more efficient for us to outsource the majority of our scanning to the Internet Archive 
rather than to purchase equipment and hire people to operate scanning machines. The 
marginal cost o f scanning documents through the Internet Archive approximates the cost of 
photocopying the same document. Other libraries might make different decisions, of course. If 
a library aspired to specialize in the digital representation o f ancient documents, for example, 
then it might make sense to develop scanning expertise in house.
Another practical example arises from our production of online finding aids. W hen I first 
arrived in my position, we had not converted any of our finding aids to Encoded Archival 
Description (EAD). In conversation with our manuscript librarian, I came to the conclusion 
that it would be more efficient to send out our finding aids (in Microsoft Word format) to 
an outsourcer with offshore operations in India. We devoted our staff time to improving the 
quality of the finding aids before sending them out for encoding and checking the quality 
o f the encoding when the documents were returned to us. While not a frictionless process, 
outsourcing our encoding allowed us to concentrate our attention on the content of the finding 
aids rather than their markup. We also freed up our manuscript librarian from painstakingly 
retyping (or “cutting and pasting”) our content from Word to XML. As a consequence, we put 
227 encoded finding aids online within a matter o f months rather than years.
Let’s get back to our three columns: core, marginal, and market. My placement of the 
integrated library system (ILS) in the market (i.e., vendor) column may raise objections. Few 
initiatives have been so disruptive in the library world as the introduction during the past 
few years of open source ILS. Whereas purchasing an ILS from a vendor was once a foregone 
conclusion, libraries now have the option of installing an open source ILS. But what is an open 
source ILS (or any open source software)? An open source system like Evergreen or Koha does 
not fit cleanly into either category.20 Individual libraries do not develop open source systems,
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at least not exclusively —  this marks the difference between open source and so-called “home 
grown” ILS, which suffered bad reputations (i.e., as inefficient choices). But, while vendors 
exist to service them, vendors do not own open source ILS. In short, open source software 
seems to inhabit a different space than the firm and the market.
In a seminal paper from 2002 titled “Coases’s Penguin, or Linux and ‘The Nature of the 
Firm /” Yochai Benkler contends that peer-to-peer production in fact represents a distinct 
context of production from the firm and the market. “The emergence of free software as a 
substantial force in the software-development world poses a puzzle for this organization theory,” 
he argues. “Free software projects do not rely either on markets or on managerial hierarchies 
to organize production.”21 Benkler, Berkman Professor of Entrepreneurial Legal Studies at 
Harvard Law School, suggests that we need to think about a third form of production, namely 
peer production, when drawing the efficient boundary of the firm. In other words, managers 
may actually have three options when deciding how to draw the boundary of the firm —  
hiring, purchasing, or engaging with the open source community.
The notion of using open source software in libraries is much less controversial now than a 
decade ago. After all, many libraries routinely install Firefox browsers on library computers, and 
a substantial number operate websites with open source programming languages like PHP that 
connect to open source databases such as MySQL on top of the open source Apache web server 
and Linux operating system.22 The use of open source software may no longer be controversial, 
but special collections librarians have not yet grasped the significance of the emergence of this 
third mode of production for hiring or purchasing decisions. While a few libraries sponsor 
open source projects (the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the University of Virginia, 
and the University of California at Berkeley spring immediately to mind), most libraries do not 
provide encouragement for staff members to engage in peer-to-peer projects. Librarians, if they 
engage in peer-to-peer production, generally do so at their own initiative and on their own 
time. In many cases, there may be wasted productivity, that is, there may be many librarians 
who could make significant contributions to open source projects which would pay dividends 
not only to their own libraries but also to the practice of librarianship as a whole who do not 
make such contributions because they are not encouraged to or, in some cases, are actively 
discouraged from doing so.23
The failure of many special collections librarians to consider peer production as a viable 
alternative to in-house development or market transactions may actually be producing 
inefficient boundaries. For, as Benkler argues, peer production “has certain systematic 
advantages over the other two [forms o f production] in identifying and allocating human 
capital/creativity.”24 Benkler provides a rich set of arguments in defense o f this thesis, which 
elude easy summarization. However, a basic contention is that open source projects do a better 
job of allocating the most skilled and creative agents to the appropriate tasks.25 For example, a 
library developing a digital library project may employ a highly competent metadata librarian 
who is only moderately competent at user interface development. The library could contract 
out to the market for a user interface specialist, but the information costs of identifying a skilled 
specialist acquainted with the library market would likely be high. So the most expedient 
choice would be to ask the metadata librarian to develop the user interface, even if that means
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having a second-rate interface. By contrast, if the library releases its new project under an open 
source license, a user interface specialist at another library might self-identify as someone who 
could develop a first-rate interface, thus significantly enhancing its appearance and usability 
without charging up the information costs of the project.
When working with partners external to their organizations, librarians need to change 
their habits somewhat. Here are a few tips toward making the experience successful from 
our experience at the Princeton Seminary Library. First, make your expectations as explicit 
as possible. The more clearly you communicate at the onset o f a project the more likely you 
will be satisfied with the outcome. In some cases, this communication will take the form of 
a Service Level Agreement (SLA), which formally specifies responsibilities on both sides. In 
other cases, communication may take place through the exchange of model documents. For 
example, we’ve carried out projects on the basis o f an informal set o f guidelines and a model 
document (with embedded comments) indicating how to instantiate those guidelines. Second, 
monitor quality quickly and promptly. When an outsourcer delivers a product, you should 
have a method in place to sample its quality. If a batch of materials is small, this may mean 
looking over all the documents, paying particular attention to known sources of error. If a 
batch is big, e.g., thousands of bibliographic records, you will either have to automate the 
quality control process or use a sampling method. Whatever method you adopt, do not let the 
quality control process slide. Generally, outsourcers specify a certain window of time for you to 
report any issues with their deliverables. While a generous outsourcing company may correct 
errors pointed out after the formal window has closed, good practice dictates monitoring 
quality as soon as possible after delivery. Finally, a third tip is to communicate with your 
outsourcing company as frequently as feasible. In some cases, you may wish to arrange weekly 
conference calls to monitor the progress of your project. In others, irregular phone calls to your 
sales representative may be sufficient. Developing a rapport with your outsourcers before you 
come across problems in deliverables will make it much easier to agree on course corrections. 
Additionally, good outsourcers frequently act like consultants, giving you indications o f what 
other libraries and vendors are doing and suggesting improvements to your processes.
The purpose of this paper was modest. My goal was to suggest that special collections 
librarians must think more explicitly about how to allocate their resources when deciding 
how to develop new products and services. By considering only staff resources or looking 
only at market prices, librarians fail to make economically efficient decisions. The transaction 
cost of organizing projects using the market (or other mechanisms) must also be considered. 
Furthermore, the emergence of peer production introduces a new factor into this calculus, 
which librarians have only recently and inadequately taken into account when making decisions 
about deploying resources. We can hope that by taking the work of Coase, Williamson, and 
Benkler into account, special collections librarians will draw more efficient boundaries for their 
departments and thus increase their productivity and range of services for their patrons.
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